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1. ABSTRACT 
Despite well meaning intentions, many aid interventions fail for one reason or another. The reasons are varied: 
lack of consideration of local circumstances and process requirements, and in particular inadequate involvement 
of affected stakeholders as well as inadequate cross-sectorial coordination. This is not surprising given poor 
organizational memory combined with decisions being made under time pressure and strict deadlines combined 
with little adaptive capacity. Additionally, information about the importance of process requirements and 
engagement is qualitative and as such is unfortunately often given secondary importance. 
 
To address this, we suggest a Risk assessment component as part of the project design phase based on Bayesian 
Networks (BNs) utilizing expert and local knowledge. This not only improves organizational memory and 
transparency but also provides a direct link for assessing cost benefits and minimizing the risk of failure. Most 
importantly this prioritizes engagement, processes and an understanding of the local context. This paper 
describes how BNs have been developed and tested on water supply interventions in the town of Tarawa, 
Kiribati. Models have been populated using data from interviews and literature to evaluate water supply options, 
i.e. rainwater harvesting, desalination and reserve extensions; this paper reports only on the model relating to 
reserves extension, i.e. new reserves for protection of groundwater extracted for water distribution purposes. 
Keywords: Bayesian Networks (BNs), Risk assessment, Water aid development 
2. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we explore the application of BN analysis to a water-related development intervention; 
exemplified by a case study in a small atoll town in the small Pacific island nation of Kiribati. This method is 
complementary to methods such as Lifecycle Assessment (LCA), Triple Bottom Line Assessment (TBL) and 
Multi-Criteria Assessment (MCA) for evaluating water supply options.  
2.1. The Case Study context 
Tarawa is located in the country of Kiribati which is an island nation in the Pacific Ocean which stretches across 
the equator, and borders the international dateline. Kiribati is culturally and geographically located in the Pacific 
region of Micronesia and consists of 33 islands, of which 32 are either coral atolls or coral reef islands. Tarawa 
lies within the Gilbert Group and geologically it is an atoll island chain, i.e. a string of closely connected sandy 
islands on a base of coral, with a lagoon in the centre (Jones 1997).  Tarawa, the capital of Kiribati, has a 
population around 46,000 which represents about half of the national population (Kiribati National Statistics 
Office 2006). Tarawa is administratively divided into South Tarawa and North Tarawa. Whilst the islands of 
North Tarawa are essentially rural, the islands of South Tarawa are urbanized and because of their small total 
land area of approximately 15 square kilometers the island group has a population density of at 2,558 persons 
per square kilometer (Kiribati National Statistics Office 2006). This is on par with urban population densities in 
the developed world, and well above population densities in most Australian cities. In Betio, the most densely 
populated island of Tarawa, the population density is at least 8,500 people per square kilometer; which puts 
considerable pressures on natural resources such as land and water. Kiribati is classified by the United Nations 
(2008a, 2008b) as both a Small Island Developing State and as a Least Developed Country but also as a Small 
Town (Pilgrim et al 2004). From an urban water management perspective, this means, that Tarawa has 
considerable human and financial resources constraints, small size and lack of economies of scale, remoteness, 
economic vulnerability, unpredictable growth and high levels of resource uncertainty. Additionally, the 
unemployment rate in Tarawa is extremely high; with a majority of the resident workforce being engaged in 
subsistence type activities (Asian Development Bank 2002). Tarawa relies mainly on groundwater for 
reticulated water supply but many households do not have access to such supply (Falkland 2003). Unfortunately 
access to good quality groundwater is restricted by over-population and a shortage of land; for these reasons 
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alternative water sources are used, i.e. rainwater harvesting at a household level and desalination feeding into 
the supply system as well as at one hospital and one hotel (Falkland 2003). Groundwater for the reticulated 
water supply is extracted via infiltration galleries on the islands of Bonriki and Buota (Metutera 2003). In 
addition, most households rely, either fully or partially, on extracting groundwater from domestic shallow wells 
(Asian Development Bank 2000). Despite these alternative sources, reticulated water remains the main supply 
for many households, but this supply is intermittent and often fails to meet demand (White et al 1999). For 
example, there is no 24-hour supply as this is thought to lead to excessive demand and leakage (Metutera 2002).  
2.2. Ongoing failures to consider complexity  
Over the past 30 years, considerable funding has been spent on aid to the water and sanitation sectors in Kiribati, 
but with few a exceptions, these have had a less than adequate impact (White et al 2008). Projects have been 
characterized by narrow short-term focus, and some have been driven by international agendas rather than 
consideration of local needs, priorities and context (White et al 2008). The difficulties of considering the social 
complexity in development interventions are highlighted by the failed attempts at creating new water reserves in 
Tarawa.  There have been efforts to resolve this problem through the application of a Companion Modelling 
approach (Perez et al 2003; Dray et al 2006 & 2007) aiming at “providing the relevant information to the local 
actors, including institutional and local community representatives, to facilitate dialogue and devise together 
sustainable and equitable water management practices” (Dray et al 2006, pp.1-2). The outcome of this process 
was a co-management framework as a pathway forward, but unfortunately key stakeholders did not take 
ownership of the negotiated outcomes and political conflicts and rivalries caused a stalemate situation. This 
experience has highlighted the need to 1) increase the ability of international and local agencies to consider local 
customs, culture and context within planning processes; 2) improve the ability of local agencies to manage their 
system despite resource deficiencies; and 3) improve the adaptive and coordination capacity, and embed 
negotiation abilities within institutional structures. 
2.3. Entering the learning cycle 
This paper describes a component which is part of a larger study, as described by Moglia and Perez (2007). 
Additionally, the study builds on previous research and experiences in Tarawa, such as the large scale SAPHE 
project funded by the Asian Development Bank (2008), the AtollGame and AtollScape experiences, but also the 
work of researchers such as Paul Jones, Ian White and Tony Falkland (Jones 1997; White et al. 1999; Falkland 
et al. 1999; Falkland 2003; White et al. 2003; White et al. 2008). 
2.4. Rationale 
In the given complex and dynamic context, this paper describes how BNs can be used to temporarily move to a 
situation where cause and effect relationships are discoverable. It is acknowledged that many project 
implementations have failed for diverse reasons. The reasons may have been obvious for some stakeholders, but 
for other stakeholders they were surprising. This shows that there is a need for incorporating local and expert 
knowledge into the planning process. Fundamentally, this is because each location and context has a unique 
profile of issues, constraints and boundary conditions that need to be considered. Using judgments and 
evaluations from past experiences, and by researchers, experts and local stakeholders, we map the factors that 
have previously impacted on the chances of success.  Whilst the type of analysis has been applied to a number 
of potential interventions in the Tarawa water system, the current paper describes the situation surrounding the 
extension of water reserves. This intervention is perceived by a number of stakeholders as the only feasible 
option for providing sufficient water supply volumes to a growing population.  
3. BAYESIAN NETWORK ANALYSIS  
BNs provide a methodology to include inductive, abductive and deductive reasoning and BN’s are particularly 
suitable for handling uncertainties, and supporting adaptive management (Boulanger and Brechet 2005). They 
are also particularly suitable for combining qualitative and quantitative information into integrated assessments 
(Castelletti and Soncini-Sessa 2007). For the particular case of water development interventions in Tarawa, a 
number of issues were considered in specifying the modeling requirements: 1) In the narratives about success or 
failure of interventions we often encounter conflicting information, and we therefore need the ability to handle 
multiple and conflicting hypothesis; and 2) the reliability of information is variable; for example statements in 
official reports by reputable experts as opposed to statements made over lunch by a government official; and so 
we need to allow for taking this diversity in information reliability into account. We also note that BNs do not 
support feedback loops, as only acyclic cause and effect networks can be modeled. The design of a BN has three 
components; its 1) Ontological component, which is the definition of terminology; 2) Qualitative component, 
which is the definition of causal relationships; and 3) Quantitative component, which consists of judgments of 
the state of topic domains. Validity of the BNs has been evaluated informally by comparing with the risks of 
historical projects, and to evaluate the consistency with observations.  
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3.1. Ontological component 
The factors, i.e. topic domains impacting on the success or failure of reserves extension as shown, in Table 1 
were identified to influence the chances of successful reserves extension. These topic domains were identified 
via semi-structured interview results, as well as key documents that mention reserves extensions in Tarawa.  
Table 1: Descriptions of topic domains impacting on successful water reserves extension 
Topic domain / Node Description 
DR: Declaration of reserves Formal declaration of reserves, including a strategy for dealing with landowners, and 
legal arrangements to support this 
CA: Community agreement Overall agreement from landowners with a stake in the reserves 
RM: Reserves management Management of the reserves, in terms of ensuring no unsuitable land use or pollution 
occurs, and ideally that vegetation is cleared 
SE: Sustainable extraction Extraction of less or equal to the sustainable extraction rate, which depends on the 
rainfall conditions, i.e. droughts, and knowing the sustainable extraction rates. 
LA: Legal arrangements The legal arrangements that will allow the declaration of the reserves, and which ought 
to define the status and rights of landowners 
EP: Engagement process The process by which relevant stakeholders, i.e. landowners, are engaged. In particular 
whether it has allowed for the traditional pattern of Maneaba decision making 
TO: Traditional sense of 
ownership 
Referring to whether the landowners feel ownership and pride over their land, and 
whether they feel an obligation to protect it from harm and intrusion 
IC: Institutional commitment and 
strength 
The extent by which the key institutions are committed and strong enough to manage 
the water reserves; and whether they support or undermine the process. 
CV: Clearing of vegetation Whether vegetation is being cleared on the reserves in order to increase sustainable 
extraction rates, and to make transparent inappropriate land use 
GI: Groundwater investigations Investigations of the thickness and width of the freshwater lens in order to establish a 
sustainable extraction rate 
M: Monitoring Monitoring the salinity of the freshwater lens, to evaluate whether over-extraction is 
occurring. This also may involve monitoring of water quality. 
SP: Sustainable pumping Ensuring that pumping supports sustainable extraction 
CM: Co-management of  reserve Co-management of water reserves including landowners and the relevant Government 
departments and the PUB, as suggested in the AtollGame project 
 
 
Figure 1: Bayesian Network diagram showing factors influencing successful reserves extension 
Note: DR = Declaration of Reserves; CA = Community Agreement; RM = Reserves Management; SE = 
Sustainable Extraction; LA = Legal Arrangements; CoM = Co-Management; EP = Engagement Process; TO = 
Traditional Sense of Ownership; ICS = Institutional Commitment and Strength; CV = Clearing of Vegetation; 
GI = Groundwater Investigations; M = Monitoring; SP = Sustainable Pumping. 
3.2. Qualitative component 
The causal links between the items detailed in Table 1 have been identified based on qualitative statements in 
reports and in interviews. As per Figure 1, successful reserves extension depends on Reserves management, 
Declaration of reserves, and Sustainable extraction, and 1) chances of successful Declaration of reserves are 
improved by Community agreement and Adequate Legal arrangements; while 2) chances of successful Reserves 
management are improved by Institutional commitment and strength, Clearing of vegetation, and a Traditional 
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sense of ownership over land; and 3) chances of successful Sustainable extraction is improved by Groundwater 
investigations, Monitoring, Sustainable pumping and the Clearing of Vegetation. Similarly the chances of 1) 
Community agreement are influenced by the implementation of a Co-management framework, an Appropriate 
and Culturally Sensitive Engagement processes, and Clearing of vegetation; which 2) in turn impacts on the 
chances of a Traditional sense of ownership which will allow for better Enforcement of protection of the land. 
We note that successful reserves extension is defined as 1) having a declaration of reserves which is respected, 
2) community agreement and cooperation in the management of reserves; 3) efficient reserves management, 
including adequate protection of reserves, as well as 4) sustainable extraction of freshwater resources. This is of 
course a matter of definition, and such criteria should ideally be specified together with relevant stakeholders. 
3.3. Quantitative component 
In quantifying the links, a number of assumptions were made, as shown in Table 2 and 3. These probabilities all 
refer to Bayes formula and, if we use the details from the first row in Table 3, we get the “The probability that 
we have successful declaration of reserves in the event of community agreement, is equal to 80%”. In order to 
apply the model, we also need to specify the conditions, i.e. the state of the topic domains for each scenario.  
Table 2: Data sources for ‘Reserves extensions’ status quo scenario 
Data source Topic domain State Estimated 
probability 
Certainty 
Sectoral Strategy and 
Action Program 
(Falkland 2004) 
Conflicts Conflicts regarding the reserves 90% 80% 
Engagement process Culturally sensitive process 10% 80% 
Legal arrangements Legal arrangements in place 75% 80% 
Pressure for increasing lease 
payments 
Pressure for increasing lease 
payments 
90% 80% 
Local official #1 Community agrees Community agrees 10% 70% 
Institutional commitment 
and strength 
Institutions are not committed 
and/or weak 
80% 70% 
Local official #2 Monitoring Adequate monitoring 80% 70% 
Sustainable pumping Sustainable pumping 80% 70% 
Local official #3 Settlements on reserves New settlements on reserves 99% 80% 
White et al 2009 Co-management Co-management 5% 95% 
White et al 1999, 
Crennan 1998 
Conflicts Conflicts regarding the reserves 90% 95% 
Legal arrangements No legal arrangements in place 90% 95% 
Traditional sense of 
ownership 
Land owners do not feel a 
traditional sense of ownership 
90% 95% 
Expert #1 Clearing of vegetation Clearing of vegetation 10% 80% 
Enforcement of protection Inefficient enforcement  90% 80% 
Groundwater investigations Adequate investigations 90% 85% 
Monitoring Adequate monitoring 75% 85% 
Removal of fences Fences are illegally removed 95% 80% 
Sustainable extraction Non-sustainable extraction 75% 85% 
AtollGame researchers 
(Pascal Perez and 
Anne Dray personal 
communication) 
Conflicts Conflicts regarding the reserves 90% 80% 
Enforcement of protection Inefficient enforcement  90% 80% 
Engagement process Technocratic process 90% 80% 
Pressure for increasing lease 
payments 
Pressure for increasing lease 
payments 
90% 80% 
Traditional sense of 
ownership 
Land owners do not feel a 




Illegal activities Illegal activities occur on reserves 100% 95% 
Settlements on reserves New settlements on reserves 100% 95% 
Vandalism Vandalism occurs 90% 80% 
Table 3: Data sources for ‘Reserves extensions’ what-if co-management scenario 





Perez and Anne Dray) 
Clearing of vegetation Clearing of vegetation 90% 80% 
Co-management Co-management 90% 80% 
Community agreement Community agrees 90% 80% 
Institutional commitment 
and strength 
Institutions are strong and 
committed 
90% 80% 
Legal arrangements Legal arrangements in place 99% 95% 
Sustainable pumping Sustainable pumping 90% 80% 
Traditional sense of 
ownership 
Land owners keep a traditional 
sense of ownership 
90% 80% 
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Notes: The certainty column refers to the extent by which each opinion can be trusted, and rather than assessing the reliability of each 
opinion on its own we have simply applied blanket rules; i.e. Experts’ opinions within their domain expertise, and stated in a publicly 
available report or publication, is considered 95% reliable; Experts’ opinions outside their domain expertise, but stated in a publicly 
available report or publication, is considered 80% reliable; Government officials’ opinions within their domain expertise, and stated in a 
publicly available report or publication, is considered 85% reliable; Government officials’ opinions outside their domain expertise, and 
stated in a publicly available report or publication, is considered 70% reliable; Direct observation are considered 95% reliable, and 
deductions of 15% are made if observations have been made by persons other than the analyst; and If opinions instead have been stated 
verbally, or in a non-formal manner, 15% certainty is being deduced from the above scores. 
3.4. Software environment 
Sheba is a software application for performing predictive analysis under conditions of uncertainty; providing a 
framework to structure and analyze categorical reasoning problems. It applies Analysis of Competing 
Hypotheses using Subjective Logic (Pope and Jøsang 2005) to reason about the effect on the projected outcomes 
dependent on categories of information, even when data is sparse. Techniques are used to calculate the effect of 
out-of-date information, and unreliable sources and observations (Pope et al 2006). This enables for creating 
assessments that reflect data availability; highlighting the uncertainty created by lack of relevant or reliable data. 
4. RESULTS 
In this paper, two scenarios relating to reserves extensions are explored 1) The Status quo-scenario, i.e. 
describing the state of topic domains in the reserves extension and management efforts so far; and 2) a Co-
management scenario based on the recommendations from a Companion Modelling exercise, i.e. the AtollGame 
experience where stakeholders were involved in a role-playing game and thereby identified a management 
framework (Dray et al 2006 & 2007). The results of the BN analysis are shown in Table 4 where the estimated 
chances of successful outcomes “Opinions” and the ‘Certainty’ of this estimate are shown for the various topic 
domains. In traditional statistics terms this would represent the width of the confidence interval (or significance 
level if a hypothesis test is applied) for the model parameter that describes the probability of success. The reason 
for the wording of the term ‘opinion’ instead of ‘estimated probability’ is to indicate that this typically has been 
estimated on the basis of (more or less well informed) opinions and evaluations by stakeholders and experts. 
Table 4: Results of scenarios 
 Status quo scenario Co-management scenario 
Topic domain & State Opinion Certainty Opinion Certainty 
Chance of Successful Community agreement 9% 86% 77% 76% 
Chance of successful Declaration of reserves 17% 70% 69% 59% 
Chance of efficient Enforcement of protection 4% 93% 83% 67% 
Chance of Sustainable extraction 78% 70% 81% 74% 
Efficient reserves extension 9% 84% 63% 65% 
 
We note that the chance of success using the Status quo-scenario is small at 9%, and that Enforcement of 
protection of the water reserves would be close to impossible (4% chance); whilst with a Co-management 
scenario, there would be an 83% chance of successful Enforcement of protection, and 63% chance of successful 
Reserves extension. This shows the futility of previous efforts during the SAPHE project to establish water 
reserves under the current institutional arrangements; whilst the framework that had been developed in a 
participatory and collegiate mode with stakeholders and traditional land-owners is one way forward. We also get 
an idea about what contributes the most to the chances of success by exploring which of the contributing factors 
has the greatest influence. This is calculated in the Sheba software, by setting 100% chance of success for 
combinations of 100% opinion and certainty in Topic domains, but with assessment of the influence of the other 
Topic domains. This type of sensitivity analysis provides the results shown in the bar chart of Figure 2, where 
each bar represents the chance of overall success given a particular combination of completely certain success of 
factors (abbreviated as per Figure 1). We see that Community agreement (CA) is of critical importance, which 
outperforms even a three factor combination of Institutional Commitment and Strength (ICS), Monitoring (M), 
and Employing a culturally and sensitive process for engagement (CS).  
 
We note that this three-factor approach from only a water quality point of view would be give chances of 
successful enforcement of protection at 87%, and chances of community agreement at 92%, however, the 
overall probability of sustainable extraction is a mere 65%. Adding sustainable pumping and appropriate 
groundwater investigations to the mixture brings the chances of success to 73%, and this means that there is now 
also sustainable extraction. The reason for the low value of 73% remaining means that there would most likely 
remain some conflict surrounding the reserves. Thus, while from an equity point of view not ideal; from an 
engineering and health perspective this solution would with be adequate with a high likelihood of success. 
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5. DISCUSSION 
A process for incorporating diverse knowledge and information into the assessment of water supply options has 
been developed based on BNs. By incorporating diverse knowledge and information into framework 
acknowledging uncertainty, it recognizes that providing urban water supply options often needs to take into 
account very specific local conditions and complex adaptive systems features, as well as social issues that often 
relate to organizational capability and community attitudes. Because of resource and funding constraints, perfect 
scientific understanding is not available, and even if such understanding and knowledge becomes available, the 
situations are so dynamic that once we fully understand it the system has changed and therefore, perfect 
scientific understanding may be of limited value. The best option is to enable a scientific dialectic process 
(which is in its essence Hegelian as it is iteration between thesis and antithesis thus enabling synthesis) down to 
the level of stakeholders and experts on the ground. The described BNs allow for embedding the assumptions 
and conceptual models into a formal model; and as such it is suitable for supporting collective learning via 
iterative model building, evaluation against empirical evidence and stakeholder deliberation.  
 
 
Figure 2: Contribution of factors, or combinations of factors, towards success of reserves extension 
 
In this way, BNs provide an alternative and complementary method to other approaches such as LCA, TBL and 
MCA, for assessing water supply options. However, LCA only really considers the physical system, and 
primarily focuses on environmental impacts. The TBL approach includes the quantified value of various 
configurations, albeit from three perspectives and typically does not include risk assessment or implementation 
processes and is relatively poor at considering qualitative information. MCA formalizes the decision making and 
can be used in a deliberative process and can capture qualitative information, but suffers from many of the same 
limitations as TBL; and provides little guidance about implementation and context dependency. We believe that 
in addition to their obvious benefits in risk analysis, BNs are better at representing the cognitive reasoning, 
based on the types of causality that people employ for decision making. BNs are also better at including wider 
types of knowledge and information that is uncertain and where there is conflicting information. This means that 
also information which is controversial and uncertain can be incorporated, with appropriate acknowledgement 
of levels of certainty, and without having to wait for a perfect understanding of all relationships. 
 
From a validity point of view, we note that the conclusions of the model described in this paper are very similar 
to what was arrived at using a Companion Modelling process (i.e. the AtollGame experience). This raises a 
questions relating to 1) the extent to which the formulation of the model described in this paper has been 
influenced by interactions with the researchers involved in AtollGame; and 2) whether BN modeling is in fact an 
alternative to Companion Modelling in terms of incorporating local and expert knowledge into the formulation 
of solutions to complex resource problems. What is clear is that knowledge from the AtollGame experience has 
been used in the formulation of this BN model. The next step, in order to answer the second question, would be 
to develop a BN model in isolation to the AtollGame in order to find out whether the modeling outcomes differ. 
Another key issue which has not been discussed in this paper is that BNs can help in identifying key information 
gaps; by finding those topic domains that impact critically on the outcome of the model, and evaluating what the 
impact of better information would be in terms of increasing the certainty in estimates. The model in this paper 
will feed into feasibility assessment of water supply options, and will help in formulating risk assessments and 
cost-benefit analysis of management options in a risk-sense, as per Australian New Zealand Standard for risk 
management. Importantly, the model allows for quantifying the cost-benefit of a culturally and contextually 
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sensitive engagement approach. This means that project managers and financial officers can evaluate project 
designs and intervention strategies; and formally assess the riskiness of water aid. We believe that Bayesian 
Network analysis, based on an understanding of history, may help facilitate better management practices in the 
development sector. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has shown that BN models can be applied in a framework to understand the complicated web of 
factors that influence and impact on the chance of success of an aid development strategy in a socially complex 
and highly resource constrained environment. Such situations are not unusual but rather typical in the 
development sector; particularly in the sphere of small town water systems which have been identified as 
lacking adequate management frameworks. The results also show that for the particular intervention that we 
have explored, considering the social and cultural context; and adhering to inclusive and appropriate 
engagement processes is critical in order to achieve success. Whilst that is in fact a common finding in the 
context area; what is novel is that this framework allows quantification of the risk of choosing a particular 
project design and engagement procedure. This means that such issues are not neglected when projects are 
conceived and designed by bureaucrats and engineers as it seems to have been common practice. The vision for 
the future of this methodology is to incorporate this type of risk analysis as part of the project design in the 
development sector. We believe that this would better bridge the gap between policy makers, engineers and 
local stakeholders and would drastically increase the success rate in overseas aid. Additionally, this approach 
addresses all the recommendations coming out of the AtollGame and AtollScape experiences. 
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